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EMPLOYMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
CONSIDERATIONS RESPECTING
TRIBAL REGULATION OF THE
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
G. WILLIAM RICE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the (mis)perceptions resulting from the success of
a few Tribes in the conduct of gaming enterprises, Indians retain the
dubious distinction of having the lowest per capita income of any
identifiable group in the United States according to the 1990 Census.
The per capita income of Indians averaged $8,328.00 compared to
$15,687.00 for whites according to that census.l The problems facing
Indians, largely as a result of lack of economic opportunities within the
Indian Country, do not end with lack of funds. The Indian Health
Service has found that:
In Fiscal Year 1995, the IHS service population (count of those
American Indians and Alaska Natives who are eligible for IHS
services) will be approximately 1.37 million. The IHS service
population is increasing at a rate of about 2.2 percent per year,
excluding the impact of new Tribes. The Indian population
residing in the IHS service area is younger than the U.S. All
Races population, based on the 1990 Census. For Indians, 34
percent of the population was younger than 15 years, and 6
percent was older than 64 years. For the U.S. All Races
population, the corresponding values were 22 and 13 percent
respectively. The Indian median age was 24.2 years compared
with 32.9 years for U.S. All Races. According to the 1990
Census, Indians have lower incomes than the general popula-
tion. In 1989, Indians residing in the current Reservation
States had a median household income of $19,886 compared
with $30,056 for the U.S. All Races population. During this
time period, 31.6 percent of Indians lived below the poverty
The Honorable G. William Rice, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of
Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Citizen Band
Potowatomi Indians of Oklahoma. Member, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in
Oklahoma.
1. Census Bureau Server, World Wide Web at http://www.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/date=
829124518.
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level in contrast to 13.1 percent for the U.S. All Races popula-
tion .2
The Indian Health Service further found,
In 1989-1991, the Indian (IHS service area) age-adjusted
mortality rates for the following causes were considerably
higher than those for the U.S. All Races population: 1) tuber-
culosis - 440 percent greater, 2) alcoholism - 430 percent
greater, 3) accidents - 165 percent greater, 4) diabetes mellitus
- 154 percent greater, 5) homicide - 50 percent greater, 6)
pneumonia and influenza - 46 percent greater, and 7) suicide -
43 percent greater. 3
These figures, while shocking in themselves, indicate a greater
problem in the Indian Country. As Congress has recognized, "Indian
people will never surrender their desire to control their relationships both
among themselves and with non-Indian governments, organizations, and
persons." 4 Indeed, for five hundred years, Indian patriots have worked
tirelessly to achieve one ultimate goal-survival as a distinct people in
our own homelands-in the face of a concerted course of action by the
United States intended to destroy Indian Tribes and assimilate Indian
people into the American mainstream. Survival requires obtaining the
means to earn a living. In the world economy today, that means the
investment of capital and the creation of businesses and employment
opportunities. Survival as a people, requires that these efforts be created
and regulated in a way which is consistent with the culture, values, and
traditions5 of the various Tribes. In order for this to occur, tribal
government must be able to exercise governmental authority over
employers and employees within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe,
and provide a legal infrastructure which is attractive to the investment of
capital and creation of business, while remaining consistent with Tribal
values.
In addressing the issues regarding tribal governmental authority
with respect to the regulation of the employer-employee relationship
within the Indian Country of a tribe, it is imperative that certain basic
parameters be first reviewed. Among these are the territorial area for the
exercise of tribal self-government, the source of tribal regulatory author-
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH- 1994 4 (1994).
3. Id. at 5.
4. Indian Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. 93-638 § 2, Jan. 4, 1975 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §
450(a)(2) (1994)).
5. Culture, values, and tradition are generally referred to as "the common law" in Anglo-
American jurisprudence.
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ity over both Indians and non-Indians within that territorial area, and the
recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the Court. These consider-
ations assume, necessarily, the existence of a federally recognized tribal
government having recognized governmental authority over its own
territorial jurisdiction.
II. INDIAN COUNTRY
The term "Indian Country" was perhaps first comprehensively
defined by statute in the Act of June 30, 1834,6 as:
all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the
Mississippi river, and not within any state to which Indian title
has not been extinguished. 7
The effect of the early statutes defining Indian country was summarized
by the noted Indian law scholar, Felix Cohen, as follows: "Indian
country in all these statutes is territory, wherever situated, within which
tribal law is generally applicable, federal law is applicable only in special
cases designated by statute, and state law is not applicable at all." 8
Although the 1834 definition of Indian country was not included in
the Revised Statutes of the United States, and therefore repealed during
the general statutory codification and revision in 1874, it provided a
useful measure for the Court to apply when interpretation of statutory
laws relating to "Indian Country" and "Indian Reservations" was
required. 9 In a series of now famous cases, the Court developed a
definition of "Indian Country" at common law which included Indian
reservations however created,10 trust and restricted Indian allotments,I
and areas set aside for the use and occupancy of Indians (dependent
Indian communities) although not called a "reservation." 12
6. 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
7. Id.
8. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (1942). The complete prohibition as to
the application of state law in the Indian Country has been modified to the extent Congress has deemed
proper. See 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1994) (regulating liquor law); 25 U.S.C. § 231 (relating to health and
education); 25 U.S.C. §§ 232-33 (granting jurisdictional rights to New York state); 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1953) (conferring special criminal jurisdiction to enumerated states in Public Law 83-280); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (conferring civil jurisdiction in Public Law 83-280); 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (allowing assumption and
retrocession of civil or criminal jurisdiction by states which are not mandatory Public Law 83-280
states).
9. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,269 (1913).
10. Id. at 244: Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 206-08 (1887).
11. United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 470 (1926); United States v. Pelican. 232 U.S. 442,
447 (1914).
12. United States v. McGowan. 302 U.S. 535, 536-39 (1938); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
1996] 269
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In one of the first cases in which the Court considered the
continuing meaning of the term "Indian County" after the creation of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, the Court stated in Bates v.
Clark: 13
It follows from this that all the country described by the act of
1834 as Indian country remains Indian country so long as the
Indians retain their original title to the soil, and ceases to be
Indian country whenever they lose that title, in the absence of
any different provision by treaty or by act of Congress.' 4
Although Indian Country status had long been tied to aboriginal
ownership of the soil, the Court in Donnelly v. United States,S extended
the application of the term to lands reserved for tribes carved from the
public domain-in other words, lands which had been in non-Indian
(federal) ownership which had thereafter been set aside for Indian use
and occupancy as a tribal reservation. 16 Tribal ownership, however,
remained the benchmark indicia of Indian Country status for Indian
reservations as a historical consequence of the 1834 Act. In pre-1948
decisions of the federal courts, as well as those cases which rely without
critical analysis upon such decisions, the ownership of title to the soil was
often critical to the status of land as Indian Country or "reservation"
land.
During the same era, the Court held that land which had been
carved from the tribal domain and held in trust by the United States for
an individual Indian as an allotment was Indian Country even though the
surrounding area of the reservation had then been extinguishedl 7 , and
that land allotted to an individual Indian from a tribal domain was Indian
Country though it was held in fee simple by the individual Indian subject
to federal restrictions upon alienation. 18 Finally, the Court held that
other lands which had been set aside for homes for Indians by the
federal government were Indian Country though not called a
"reservation," 19 and that lands owned by the Pueblos in fee were Indian
Country because of the federal treatment of the Pueblos as a "dependent
Indian community," 20 These pre-1948 decisions, then, clearly indicated
that all reservations, all trust and restricted Indian allotments, and
28,37 (1913).
13. 95 U.S. 204,209 (1887).
14. Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204,209 (1887).
15. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
16. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 269 (1913).
17. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 447 (1914).
18. United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467,470 (1926).
19. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 37 (1913).
20. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538 (1938).
[VOL. 72:267270
EMPLOYMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
dependent Indian communities were within the common law definition
of Indian Country as that term was developed by the Court after the
repeal of the 1834 definition.
The foregoing decisions left open the question of whether land
within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation which was held in
fee (in other words an "open" or "assimilated" reservation) was Indian
Country. 21 The practical question presented by this "open reservation"
issue was whether federal and tribal jurisdiction remained exclusive in
reservation areas where allotments had been taken and the surplus sold
(as to those surplus lands), or where trust periods on allotments within
reservations had expired, or where restrictions against alienation of such
allotments had been removed.
In 1948, Congress resolved this issue in favor of federal and tribal
jurisdiction over trust or fee patented lands within reservations, and
codified the Supreme Court's existing common law classifications of
Indian Country by the Act of June 25, 1948,22 which states:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this
title, the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter, means
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-or-way running through the
same .23
The original impact of this Congressional action was to render
obsolete Court decisions which tied the Indian Country status of Indian
reservations and dependent Indian communities to issues of land title,
and to define by statute the territorial area for the operation of tribal
government. 24 In Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State
Penitentiary,25 the Court held that the phrase "notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent" contained in the Indian Country statute 26
included patents to both Indians and non-Indians, and Indian conduct
21. COHEN, supra note 8, at 8.
22. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)).
23. Id.
24. See United States v. Mazurie 419 U.S. 544, 547 (1975); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash.
State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
25. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
26. 18 U.S.C. §1151.
1996] 271
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on property owned in fee by non-Indians but within reservation
boundaries was therefore Indian conduct within the Indian Country. 27
Further, in United States v. Mazurie,28 the Court held that non-Indian
conduct on non-Indian owned fee lands within a continuing reservation
was conduct within the Indian Country for the purpose of federal laws
regulating the introduction of liquor into the Indian Country.29 In
response to the claim that non-Indians could not be subjected to rules of
law adopted by an Indian tribe in whose governmental affairs the non-
Indian could not participate, 30 the Court through then Justice Rehnquist
stated:
Cases such as Worcester, supra, and Kagama, supra, surely
establish the proposition that Indian tribes within "Indian
country" are a good deal more than "private, voluntary
organizations," and they thus undermine the rationale of the
Court of Appeals' decision....
The fact that the Mazuries could not become members of
the tribe, and therefore could not participate in the tribal
government, does not alter our conclusion. This claim, that
because respondents are non-Indians Congress could not
subject them to the authority of the Tribal Council with respect
to the sale of liquor, is answered by this Court's opinion in
Williams v. Lee.3 1
27. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
28. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
29. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,557-58 (1975).
30. Id. at 556. The Mazurie Court rejected the Court of Appeals reasoning, which stated:
The tribal members are citizens of the United States. It is difficult to see how such an
association of citizens could exercise any degree of governmental authority or
sovereignty over other citizens who do not belong, and who cannot participate in any
way in the tribal organization. The situation is in no way comparable to a city, county, or
special district under state laws. There cannot be such a separate 'nation' of United
States citizens within the boundaries of the United States which has any authority, other
than as landowners, over individuals who are excluded as members.
Id. (quoting Mazurie v. United States, 487 F.2d 14, 19 (10th Cir. 1973)).
31. Id. at 557-58 (citations omitted).
272 [VOL. 72:267
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The Court then, while often speaking in terms of "reservation" 32 or
"allotment" or "dependent Indian community" as relevant in a
particular circumstance clearly held that "Indian country" is the legally
recognized term of art defining the territorial area for the exercise of
tribal self-government. 33
In response to this Congressional definition of the term "Indian
Country," the Court adopted new rules to determine whether the Indian
Country status of reservation areas had been terminated. 34 These cases
teach that once an area of land has been set apart as an Indian
reservation, all tracts within that area remain Indian country until the
reservation is extinguished by Congress. The corollary to this rule is that
the statute or treaty extinguishing the reservation must be clear on its
face, or, if the statutory language could be interpreted to extinguish the
reservation but is ambiguous, the legislative history and tribal
understanding must clearly indicate an intent to terminate reservation
status.3 5 Anything less than this clear language or showing of intent and
32. See DeCoteau v. District County Ct. 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). The DeCoteau Court
stated:
If the lands in question are within a continuing "reservation," jurisdiction is in the tribe
and the Federal Government "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent .... On the
other hand, if the lands are not within a continuing reservation, jurisdiction is in the State,
except for those land parcels which are "Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same." While §
1151 is concerned on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized
that it generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.
Id. (citations omitted). After concluding that the Sisseton-Wahpeton reservation had been
disestablished, the DeCoteau Court concluded that "[iun such a situation, exclusive tribal and federal
jurisdiction is limited to the retained allotments." Id. at 446-47 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c)).
33. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648 (1978). The John Court stated that "[w]ith certain
exceptions not pertinent here, § 1151 includes within the term 'Indian country' three categories of
land. The first, with which we are here concerned, is [Indian reservations]." Id. Noting further, the
Court stated that "[ilnasmuch as we find in the first category a sufficient basis for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction in the case, we need not consider the second and third categories [of Indian
country]." Id. at 648 n.17. See also Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463.467 n.8 (1984). The Solem Court
noted that:
Regardless of whether the original reservation was diminished, Federal and tribal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over those portions of the opened lands that were and have
remained Indian allotments. In addition, opened lands that have been restored to
reservation status by subsequent act of congress fall within the exclusive criminal
jurisdiction of federal and tribal courts.
Id. (citations omitted).
34. See Solem. 465 U.S. at 481 (determining that neither the Cheyenne River Act nor surrounding
circumstances showed clear intent to diminish the reservation): DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 448-49
(determining that the 1891 Act, and surrounding circumstances indicated an intent to terminate the
Lake Traverse Indian Reservation); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 506 (1973) (determining that "the
Klamath River Reservation was not terminated by the Act of June 17, 1892, and that the land within ...
is still Indian country within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1 151") Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash.
State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351. 357 (1962) (determining that the Colville Indian Reservation still
existed since the 1906 Act did not expressly dissolve it).
35. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 448-49.
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understanding, may result in a finding that the reservation continues as
Indian Country due to the traditional rules that ambiguities are to be
resolved to the benefit of the Indians, and that Indian treaties and
agreements must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood
them 36 .
The question of continuing land ownership appeared to remain
relevant only in the context of Indian allotments outside Indian
reservations, and not within continuing reservations and dependent
Indian communities. The Court has, however, recently decided that
tribal jurisdiction does not exist for some purposes over some non-
Indian owned fee lands within reservation boundaries nothwithstanding
the plain terms of 18 U.S.C. § 115137 and its former decision in
Seymour.38 On the other hand, the Court has also expansively described
the term Indian Country to include all tribally held trust properties, as
36. See Salem, 465 U.S. at 475-76; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504-05.
37. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,425-
26 (1989) (holding that Indian tribes did not have authority to zone fee lands in reservation's "open"
area); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) (holding that the Crow Tribe of Montana
had no power to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by
nonmembers of the Tribe). These cases ignore the obvious intention of Congress, as it framed 18
U.S.C. § 1151(a), to avoid deciding issues of jurisdiction within Indian reservations by reference to a
tract ownership book, making these decisions difficult to harmonize with the statute and prior
decisions. South Dakota v. Bourland provided less difficulty because the Court found a specific
Congressional statute which vested the regulatory authority claimed in a federal governmental entity
rather than the tribe. 113 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1993).
38. 368 U.S. at 357. Brendale and Montana may simply be the result of the Court attempting to
protect what it perceives as the "inalienable" private property rights desired by non-Indians who own
real property within Indian Country from claimed infringement by the tribe. Regretfully, the Court has
never come to terms with its recently developed discriminatory rules which require Indians to be
subject to state law while outside Indian Country. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game,
391 U.S. 392, 397-401 (1968) (determining that Indians were subject to state fishing regulations when
on state waters); accord Organized Village of Kake v. Eagan. 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, (1942); Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928); Ward v.
Race Horse. 163 U.S. 504 (1896), although the Court has refused to subject non-Indians to tribal
jurisdiction in some circumstances when they enter the Indian Country. See, e.g., Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (finding that absent express authority from
Congress, Indian tribes have no authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); see also
discussion supra note 37.
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well as "informal Indian reservations" 39 in upholding Indian's
immunity from state laws.40
III. TRIBAL POWERS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
The most basic principle of Indian Law, supported by a
host of decisions, is that those powers which are lawfully vested
in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted
by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which have never been extinguished. The
statutes of Congress, then, must be examined to determine the
limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its
sources or its positive content.41
Most tribal governmental powers, then, do not emanate as a grant
from any other authority than the tribe's inherent sovereignty, 42 and this
source of tribal authority has been repeatedly confirmed in various
circumstances, including tribal powers of taxation, 43 civil regulatory
39. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 128 (1993). The Court's
description of the Sac and Fox reservation in Oklahoma as an "informal" Indian reservation is perhaps
in response to the many recent statutes in which Congress has defined the term "reservation" as
including "former" reservations in Oklahoma, or has treated those areas in Oklahoma in the same
manner as other Indian reservations for various purposes. The question asked of the Court was simply
this, how many times does Congress have to call it a reservation before it is one? A partial list of such
statutory references include: 7 U.S.C. § 2007c(c )(3)(B)(ii) (1994) (Establishment of Investment
Fund); 12 U.S.C. § 4702(11) (Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions); 16 U.S.C. §
1722(6) (Youth Conservation Corps and Public Lands): 25 U.S.C. § 1452 (Financing Economic
Development of Indians and Indian Organizations); 25 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(3) (Tribal Departments of
Education); 25 U.S.C. § 3103(12) (National Indian Forest Resources Management); 25 U.S.C. §
3202(9) (Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention); 25 U.S.C. § 3501(2) (Indian
Energy Resources); 29 U.S.C. § 750(c) (Vocational Rehabilitation and Other Rehabilitation Services);
33 U.S.C. § 1377(c) (Water Pollution Prevention And Control); 40 U.S.C. § 483(2) (Management and
Disposal of Government Property); 42 U.S.C. § 682(i)(6) (Grants To States for Aid and Services to
Needy Families with Children and for Child-welfare Services); 42 U.S.C. § 2992c(2) (Economic
Opportunity Program); 42 U.S.C. § 5318(n) (Community Development).
40. See Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. at 128 (finding formal or informal reservation lands are not
subject to state's taxing jurisdiction); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe
of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505. 511 (1991) (finding validly set aside trust land qualifies as reservation for
state tax immunity purposes).
41. COHEN, supra note 8. at 122.
42. Within Indian country, state jurisdiction is usually preempted both by the general federal
protection of tribal self-government- Worcester doctrine-and by specific federal statutes relating to
civil and criminal jurisdiction within Indian country. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n. 411 U.S.
164, 168-69 (1973). See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423.429 (1971) (finding tribal consent a
prerequisite to state jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d
263, 265 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (noting that federal jurisdiction governed, and the consent of the
Tribe involved is required before a state may assume jurisdiction in Indian Country). See also F.
Browning Piepestem, The Journey from Ex Parte Crow Dog to Littlechief: A Survey of Tribal Civil and
Criminal Jurisdiction in Western Oklahoma, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1979). There have been,
however, some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163.
192 (1989) (stating that states and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction relating to some commercial
transaction in the Indian Country).
43. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1982) (confirming tribes' inherent
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 72:267
authority, 44 criminal justice,45 determinations of tribal citizenship, 46
inheritance determinations, 47 control of domestic relations, 48 the
admittance or exclusion of non-members to their territory,49 and other
sovereign powers and immunities.5 0
As separate sovereigns pre-existing the United States, the United
States Constitution has repeatedly been held not to apply to, or limit, the
Tribe's powers of self-government. 5 1 Indian tribes then, as distinct
political communities, retain their original natural rights of self-
government, and remain a separate people with the power of regulating
both their members and other persons or entities within their territory
when the non-Indians have some impact on the tribe or its members.52
power to tax, regulate, and exclude non-Indians); Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134,
152 (1980) (recognizing tribes' inherent power to tax).
44. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544. 565 (1981) (recognizing tribes' inherent power to
exercise civil jurisdiction and regulate non-Indian activities on Indian lands, including leases).
45. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (recognizing tribes' power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over Indians); Talton v. Mayes. 163 U.S. 376, 381 (1896) (recognizing tribes'
jurisdiction to punish members for violations of tribal statutes).
46. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1978) (finding Congress did not provide
federal court review of tribal citizenship decisions); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222 (1897)
(recognizing tribes' power to determine tribal citizenship).
47. Jones v. Meehan. 175 U.S. 1, 29 (1899) (recognizing inheritance of tribal land governed by
the tribe).
48. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602,605-06 (1916) (recognizing tribes' control of domestic
relations).
49. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561-62 (1832) (recognizing tribes' power to
exclude nonmembers).
50. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978) (recognizing tribes' immunity
from suit by reason of sovereign immunity).
51. Santa Clara Pueblo, 426 U.S. at 54-55 (finding that the Indian Civil Rights Act does not create
a federal claim for relief to allow a federal court to control interpretation of tribal citizenship statute);
Talton V. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381 (1876) (finding that the U.S. Constitution does not control tribe's
jurisdiction over members); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971) (concluding the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to Indian tribes without the express
authority of Congress); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. 370 F.2d
529, 533 (8th Cir. 1967) (finding the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply
to actions of Indian Nations); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council 272 F.2d 131, 135
(10th Cir. 1959) (finding the First Amendment does not apply to Indian nations); Martinez v. Southern
Ute Tribe. 249 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1957) cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958) (finding the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to Indian tribes).
52. See cases cited supra notes 39-51. See also United States v. Mazurie 419 U.S. 544, 558
(1975) (holding authority of tribal courts extended to non-Indians); United States v. Kagama 118 U.S.
375 (1886) (finding Congress and the Tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on
Indian lands); COHEN, supra note 8, at 122-23.
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It follows, that Indian Tribes have the authority to enforce their
own laws in their own forums as to both Indians and non-Indians. 53 The
inherent power to tax, regulate, and exclude non-Indians has been
consistently upheld, and the widely held understanding of the federal
government has always been that federal laws have not worked a
divestiture of such powers. 54 Therefore, a tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of Indians or non-
Indians who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements and
clearly may do so where the conduct of the non-Indian threatens or has
direct effect on the Tribe or its members. 55
IV. THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Indian Commerce Clause 56 jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court will impact the issue of labor or employment laws within
the Indian Country primarily in those circumstances in which non-
Indian employers operate businesses within the Indian Country, and
when Indians (whether a tribe or individual) operate businesses within
the Indian Country which employ non-Indian employees. While the
Court has largely, and perhaps rightly, viewed the Indian Commerce
Clause during the majority of this period as a stable shield of the rights
of Indian people within the United States, it has not been immune from
the political winds of Indian policy. The Court's view of the "Indian"
Commerce Clause has changed significantly over the last three decades,
and seems to currently be in a state of flux. 57
53. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324. 325 (1983) (holding that federal
law recognizing Indians' authority to regulate hunting and fishing preempted New Mexico law);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 445 U.S. 130, 152 (1982) (holding that the federal government had
not divested the tribe of its inherent authority to tax mining activities on its land); Santa Clara Pueblo,
436 U.S. at 65 (finding that Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for
deciding disputes involving interest of both Indians and non-Indians); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S.
382, 389 (1976) (holding Tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding arising
on the reservation where all parties were members of the tribe); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223
(1959) (finding that exercise of state jurisdiction would infringe on rights of Indians to govern
themselves); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that tribe retained
inherent power to impose its health and safety regulation on non-Indian grocery store business on the
reservation).
54. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152 (holding that the tribe had not been divested of the authority to
impose a severance tax); Montana v. United States. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (noting that a tribe
maintains jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, and can regulate through taxing and
licensing requirements); Washington v. Consolidated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134. 152-53 (1980) (noting that
Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands where
the tribes have significant interest, including the power to tax).
55. See cases cited supra notes 51-54 (recognizing tribal authority for self-government).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause provides: "The Congress shall have power ... [tJo
regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
57. Compare Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989) (stating that "tax
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The Court traditionally viewed the field of Indian law, and
jurisdiction over persons and property in the Indian Country, as
generally exclusive to the Federal government and the Tribal
government, absent a particular act of Congress authorizing state
action. 58 Yet, in the modern era, it appears that the Court has lost its
traditional moorings in the field of Federal Indian Law. The result has
been a rash of conflicting decisions and litigation as the States press
onward through the fog of case by case jurisdictional determinations of
the Supreme Court in the States' continuing quest to extend state
jurisdiction into the Indian Country at the expense of tribal govern-
mental authority.
A. THE FORMATIVE YEARS
During the founding days of the Republic, the relation between the
fledgling States and the Indian Tribes was very important for the success
of the rebellion, and the safety of the new Republic, as the Indian nations
on the frontiers of the colonies held the balance of power between the
British and the colonists in their hands. 59 While the leaders of the
rebellion struggled to organize the initial resistance to the British, it
became apparent that both the non-Indians desire for land and the trade
between Indians and non-Indians had to be controlled. 60 Accordingly,
the Continental Congress organized three "Indian Departments" and
appointed respected patriots such as Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry,
James Wilson, and George Morgan to act as Indian commissioners for
the advancement of negotiations with the Indian nations independent of
the British before the issuance of the Declaration of Independence. 6 1
immunity extends to Indian Tribes for whose benefit the United States holds reservations lands in
trust." However, "a state can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on private parties with whom the United
States or an Indian tribe does business, even though the financial burden of the tax may fall on the
United States or the tribe"); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331 (1983)
(determining that a state may assert authority over a reservation only in certain situations. However,
in most instances, Indian Tribes are considered unique aggregations possessing "attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory"); and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145, 147 (1973) with Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993)
(recognizing a "deeply rooted" policy in United States history of "leaving Indians free from state
jurisdiction and control"); and County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY, 470 U.S. 226, 235-36
(1985) (stating that "[w]ith the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive
province of federal law").
58. Kennerly v. District Ct of Mont., 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971) (affirming exclusive federal and
tribal jurisdiction over persons and property in Indian Country unless explicitly given to states);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. 559 (1832) (noting that Indian nations are completely
separate from states).
59. For an excellent history of the attempts of the Continental Congress to persuade the Indian
nations to remain neutral or join in the rebellion on the side of the colonies, see GREGORY SCHAAF,
WAMPUM BELTS & PEACE TREEs (1990).
60. Id. at 5-6.
61. Id. at 6.
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Throughout the war, the Congress vacillated between diplomacy,
attempting to keep the Tribes neutral, and diplomacy attempting to enlist
their aid. 62  The net result was that the more powerful Tribal
confederations 63 splintered into various factions, and the success of the
revolution followed. In the adoption of the Articles of Confederation,
Indian issues again challenged the fledgling union of the newly inde-
pendent colonial States. The Indian trade was important economically,
prevention of Indian wars a political and economic necessity, and the
acquisition of Indian land a much sought after goal. 64 Two clauses of
the Articles of Confederation, the precursor to the current United States
Constitution, addressed these issues as follows:
Article IX(l). The United States in Congress assembled, shall
have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on
peace and war ....
Article IX(4). The United States in Congress assembled shall
also have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . .
regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians,
not members of any of the States provided that the legislative
right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
violated .65
Both Congress and the States promptly began negotiations with the
various frontier tribes for the acquisition of land and control of the trade
between those tribes and the new United States. This "exclusive right
and power," which was limited by two ambiguous clauses, proved to be
unworkable as state authorities attempted to acquire Indian lands
promised to Tribes via solemn treaty with the United States. Two
hundred years later, the meaning of these provisions of the Articles of
Confederation crystallized for one Court of Appeals in Oneida Indian
Nation of New York v. New York. 66 The Second Circuit concluded that:
62. Id.
63. Id. Principally the Iroquois (Six Nations), Muscogee (Creek), Cherokee, and Wabash north-
west of the Ohio River to the Great Lakes. Id.
64. The "legislative history" of the various drafts of this clause of the Articles of Confederation
is set out in Oneida Indian Nation of NY v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145. 1157 (2nd Cir. 1988). The
discussion in that case shows that language much more akin to the Indian Commerce Clause of the
Constitution was first proposed by Benjamin Franklin. id. (citing 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 195-199 (July 21, 1775)). The exclusive federal authority over Indian affairs proposed by
Franklin was revised in the draft presented to Congress by John Dickinson. Id. at 1156. The language
adopted in the Articles of Confederation came from further modification of the Dickinson draft. Id.
65. Articles of Confederation, art. IX(I), (4) (1777).
66. 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Once it is understood that the allocation of power
respecting all Indian affairs is governed solely by Article IX(4),
there can be little doubt, . . . that clause 4 confirmed the right
of the states to purchase Indian lands within their borders
without the consent of Congress, at least under circumstances
that did not interfere with the war and peace powers of the
Congress .67
It is difficult to comprehend how the State negotiating a purchase of
Tribal land, guaranteed to the Tribe by treaty with the United States,
perhaps from a different set of tribal leaders or under less than
honorable circumstances, would not risk an Indian war. Perhaps some
doubt remains even about whether States could negotiate land
acquisitions from the Tribes under the Articles of Confederation. The
difficulty was that neither the Congress nor the States clearly had
exclusive authority to legislate in the field of Indian affairs when the
Tribe or its land was within an area then claimed by the State. Likewise,
the determination of which Indians were "members of any States"
defied rational definition. 68 Simply stated, no clear answers existed, and
the resulting confusion played havoc with relations between the Tribes
and the fledgling United States, the Tribes and the States, and the state
and federal governments.69
The problem became so acute that the author of the Federalist could
dispose of the need to consolidate federal authority over Indian
commerce to the exclusion of the States in a paragraph:
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very
properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of
confederation, which render the provision obscure and
contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not
members of any of the states, and is not to violate or infringe
the legislative right of any state within its own limits. What
description of Indians are to be deemed members of a state, is
not yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity
and contention in the federal councils. And how the trade with
67. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1157 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis
added).
68. Did it include, in 1780, the Sioux. Navajo and other Tribes west of the Mississippi who lived
within areas claimed by the original thirteen States but who had perhaps never seen an American?
Did it include noncitizen Indians who lived within the claimed boundaries but nearer to settled areas?
Those noncitizen Indians living within "frontier" areas reserved to them by federal treaty, but also
populated in part by non-Indian squatters? Was it to include those who had severed their tribal
relations and become citizens? How was anyone to know where to draw the line which described
those Indians who were "not members" of the state?
69. See Robert N. Clinton, BOOK REVIEW, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 846,851-57 (1980).
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Indians, though not members of a state, yet residing within its
legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external
authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of
legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only
case in which the articles of confederation have inconsiderately
endeavoured to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a
partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in
the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a
part, and letting the whole remain. 70
Thus was born the Indian Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution that states in pertinent part that: "The Congress shall have
power . . . [t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes." 71 The original purpose of the
Indian Commerce clause then-to extrapolate from The Federalist -was
to consolidate exclusive power in the federal government vis-a-vis the
States to regulate commerce, in its Constitutional sense, with the Indian
tribes regardless of whether the Indians involved were citizens of a State
or within the political boundaries of a State. This purpose was
recognized in now famous decisions of the Supreme Court penned by
Chief Justice John Marshall in the first three "Indian cases" to reach the
high Court. 72
In Johnson v. McIntosh,73 the Court faced a situation in which the
plaintiffs claimed land pursuant to purchases that they had made directly
from the Piankeshaw and Illinois Nations of Indians in 1773 and 1775.74
These Indian Nations had afterwards conveyed the same land to the
United States by treaty without providing for the reservation of titles to
land individually held pursuant to tribal law, and the United States had
patented -it to others. 75 While no Indian was a party to this action
between the title holders from the United States patent and those holding
title pursuant to the tribal law, it is recognized as the first "Indian" case
coming before the Court.76 This case is remarkable in the different
perspectives from which the Court approaches the issues. However, the
important point for our purposes is that this is apparently the first-time
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 275 (James Madison) (Sherman F. Mittle ed., 1938). See also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. 559 (1832) (characterizing the terms of clause four of
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation as "ambiguous").
71. U. S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) I (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
73. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
74. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 554.
75. Id. at 558.
76. See id. at 572.
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the high Court acknowledged that tribal law could well grant property
rights to both Indians and non-Indians within a tribal legal system.77
While this recognition was only one of several alternative reasons given
for the result, the idea that Tribes could grant or withdraw property and
other legal rights, although not necessarily recognized in the federal
courts, or subject to the rules of the American legal system, became a
part of federal law.
The first direct Supreme Court interpretation of the Indian
Commerce Clause occurred in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.78 Georgia,
as had several other original states, passed a series of laws designed to
extend the laws of Georgia to the Indians within the newly recognized
borders of the State, and to annul the laws of the Cherokee Nation. 79 If
Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. New York8O is correct, this would
have been within the power of the State of Georgia under the Articles of
Confederation, since the Cherokee involved were within the claimed
legislative jurisdiction of Georgia. However, the Cherokee Nation
brought a constitutional challenge to those laws by bringing an original
action for injunctive relief in the Supreme Court of the United States as a
foreign nation under the Constitution. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,81
the Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, distinguished the Indian
Tribes from both foreign nations and States by relying in part on the
wording of the Commerce Clause listing foreign nations, states, and
Indian tribes as separate subjects of federal authority. 82 Finding that
Indian Tribes were neither States nor foreign nations as those phrases are
used in the Constitution, the Court dismissed the suit.83
The Cherokee Nation case was promptly followed by another
challenge to the authority of Georgia to extend its laws into the
Cherokee country. 84  Samuel Worcester, a non-Indian citizen of
Vermont and missionary to the Cherokee, refused to obey the Georgia
law requiring, among other things, that he obtain the permission of the
Georgia governor to reside in the Cherokee country. 85 He was convicted
and sentenced to four years in the Georgia penitentiary pursuant to state
law, and appealed that conviction to the United States Supreme Court.8 6
Acknowledging the ambiguity of the Fourth Clause of Article IX of the
77. Id. at 582.
78. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
79. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,2-3 (1831).
80. 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988).
81. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2-3.
82. Id. at 14-15.
83. Id.
84. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
85. Id. at 536-37.
86. Id.
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Articles of Confederation, Justice Marshall interpreted the Indian
Commerce Clause as excluding state authority over non-Indians who
were engaged in commerce with Indians in the Indian country:
The correct exposition of this article [of the Articles of
Confederation] is rendered unnecessary by the adoption of our
existing constitution. That instrument confers on congress the
powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that
is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the
Indians. They are not limited by any restrictions on their free
actions. The shackles imposed on this power, in the
confederation, are discarded.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse
between the United States and this nation, is, by our
constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States .87
The Court then found the Georgia laws unconstitutional and void. 88
Worcester, then, clearly stands for the proposition that lacking a contrary
treaty stipulation or act of Congress, state law has no application to
"commerce" between non-Indians and Indians within the Indian
country.8 9 The decision of the Court in Worcester, however, was not to
be the final word as other political forces were at work. The President, at
the time of the Worcester decision, was Andrew Jackson. Jackson was an
ardent supporter of the "Indian removal policy" designed to remove
Tribes from east of the Mississippi river to other lands in the west, and
bluntly informed the Cherokee that they could expect no help from the
federal government in retaining their lands in Georgia while procedural
technicalities probably prevented the Court from entering an order
directing the release of Samuel Worcester. 90 One net result of the
87. Id. at 559,561.
88. Id. at 596.
89. In this case, "commerce" was the preaching of the gospel by a non-Indian to Indians. In its
broadest sense, commerce with the Indian tribes could be considered any interaction between a non-
Indian and an Indian person or property in the Indian Country.
90. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN.
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removal policy was the Trail of Tears in which the Five Civilized Tribes
were forcibly removed from their homes in the east to other lands in
what is now the State of Oklahoma. Throughout the removal era, and
during the reservation era of the middle portion of the Nineteenth
Century, 9 1 the decisions of the Court remained relatively true to the
underlying theme of the Worcester decision.
B. THE ALLOTMENT ERA
With the coming of the allotment era in the late 1880's, the influx
of non-Indians into the Indian Country as a result of the sale of
"excess" lands to homesteaders and the sale and leasing of allotted
lands significantly changed the face of the Indian Country. 9 2 The
official policy, and widely held belief, was that once the Indian person
was given a tract of land to call his own, he would become, or could be
turned into, a brown white farmer who would reject the tribal way of life
and simply disappear into the American melting pot. The policy was
intended to destroy tribalism and tribal governments. When combined
with direct frontal attacks on the institutions of some tribal
governments, 93 this policy and the resulting expectation that with time
the Indian Tribes would cease to exist, lead the Court to accept
increasing amounts of state authority in the Indian Country by
attenuating Indian interests in "commerce" within the Indian Country.
The Court thereby allowed some limited state jurisdiction over non-
Indian activities and property, and simultaneously attempted to protect
Indians and their property until the Tribes no longer existed as
recognized entities.
For instance, in United States v. McBratney94 and Draper v. United
States,9 5 the Court held that State court jurisdiction was proper in
instances where a non-Indian committed a criminal offense against
L. REV. 500, 525-26 (1969) (discussing the procedural problems in these cases).
91. After the generalized removal, the government entered into a series of treaties in the middle
1800's in which Tribes were required to cede vast tracts of their original lands in return for specific
recognition and protection of the lands~retained or exchanged for the land ceded. The lands reserved
to the Tribe in such agreements became known as the "'reservation" of the Tribe, and was intended as
a land base for the exercise of tribal self-government separate from the non-Indians. Additional
reservations were created by executive order or congressional act.
92. See General Allotment Act of 1887 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)).
93. See generally ANGIE DEao, AND S TILL THE WATERs RUN (1940) (describing treatment of the
Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma under the allotment policy). See also F. Browning Pipestem & G.
William Rice, The Mythology of the Oklahoma Indians: A Survey of the Legal Status of Indian Tribes
in Oklahoma. 6 AMER. IND. L. REV. 259, 315 (1979) (discussing the allotment era's effect on the Indian
tribes in Oklahoma).
94. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
95. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
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another non-Indian. 96  The Court also allowed territorial, and
presumptively State, taxation of the property of the Utah and Northern
Railway located within the Indian Country in Utah & Northern Railway
v. Fisher,97 and a tax on cattle grazed by non-Indians leasing land from
the Osage Nation in Oklahoma was upheld in Thomas v. Gay98 in part
because:
[Although] it is urged that the Indians are directly and
vitally interested in the property sought to be taxed, and that
their rights of property and person are seriously affected by
the legislation complained of; that the money contracted to be
paid for the privilege of grazing is paid to the Indians as a
tribe, and is used and expended by them for their own
purposes, and that if, by reason of this taxation, the conditions
existing at the time the leases were executed were changed, or
could be changed by the legislature of Oklahoma at its
pleasure, the value of the lands for such purposes would
fluctuate or be destroyed altogether according to such
conditions. But it is obvious that a tax put upon the cattle of
the lessees is too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax upon
the lands or privileges of the Indians.99
On the other hand, cases such as The Kansas IndianslOO and The
New York Indians101 held that states had no authority to tax Indians,
though they had taken allotments and ceded their land to the United
States, while their political organization remained intact and continued its
governmental relationship with the United States.' 02 Other nineteenth
96. Draper v. United States. 164 U.S. 240,243 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621.
624 (1881).
97. 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
98. 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
99. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898). The Court went on to state that the "unlimited
power" of Congress to deal with the Indian Tribes under the Commerce Clause. "so long as they keep
up their tribal organizations," could be conceded without such state taxes running afoul of the
Constitution. Id. at 274-75. There are, perhaps, two reasons for such a statement in the wake of
Worcester. First, Indian tribes no longer constituted a serious threat to the security of the United
States. Second, the underlying assumption that the Tribes would shortly cease to exist made the idea
that Tribes might exercise continuing governmental regulatory and tax authority seem far-fetched. Be
that as it may, such State action is precisely the type of local regulation of commerce between Indians
and non-Indians that the Indian Commerce Clause was intended to prevent.
100. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
101. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866).
102. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 761 (1866); The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 761, 772 (1866). The Court went so far as to limit the rights of Oklahoma to tax non-Indians
engaged in commerce within the Indian Country into the Twentieth Century, even when federal
statutes authorized such taxation, by resort to the federal instrumentality doctrine. See generally
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922) (discussing state income tax on non-Indian mineral
lessee's income from restricted Indian allotments); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma,
240 U.S. 522 (1916) (discussing state property taxes on non-Indian mineral lease of restricted Indian
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century cases of note in this regard include Ex Parte Crow Dog 103
holding that the Lakota (Sioux) Nation retained the authority to try and
punish the murder of an Indian by another Indian in their Indian
Country and that no federal offense had been committed;1 04 United
States v. Kagama105 stating that the Indian Commerce Clause is not a
source of authority for the federal government to punish crimes
committed by one Indian against another Indian in the Indian
Country;106 and Talton v. Mayes l0 7 holding that the powers of the
Cherokee Nation to punish criminal offenses came from the inherent
powers of the Cherokee Nation existing prior to European arrival on this
continent, and not from any delegation of authority from the United
States.108
C. THE "MODERN" ERA
The allotment policy was repudiated when, in 1934, Congress
passed the Wheeler-Howard Bill known as the Indian Reorganization
Act' 09 and its companion, the Thomas-Rodgers Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Actil0 which was adopted in 1936. This legislation ended the
allotment of tribal lands, provided for the reorganization of tribal
government and acknowledgment of tribal governmental authority, and
authorized tribal control of some federal Indian programs intended for
Indians, among other provisions. "'1 While it seemed that a new day had
dawned in the Indian Country, it was not to be. Those Tribes that
accepted the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act pursuant to its
land); Choctaw & G.R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914) (discussing gross sales of coal mined on
Choctaw lands). While the federal instrumentality doctrine was laid to rest regarding Indian Country
in Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U.S. 325 (1933), it must be
remembered that the progeny of that case result from the unique laws governing the Five Civilized
Tribes and the Osage in which the federal government repeatedly gave its consent to direct state
taxation of certain property held by the members of the Five Civilized Tribes rendering such cases sui
generis. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States. 319 U.S. 598, 607 (1943) (finding that
exemption from state taxation depends on the plainly expressed intention of Congress).
103. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
104. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 559,572 (1883).
105. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
106. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886). The Court further held that the statute
establishing federal jurisdiction over certain "major crimes" in Indian Country, even when the
perpetrator and victim were both Indians, proper because the power to punish such offenses "must
exist in [the federal government] because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of
its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied,
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes." Id. However, the constitutional
underpinning for this statute has never been adequately identified, particularly in light of Ex Parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572 (determining that the Lakota had jurisdiction over such offenses).
107. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
108. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376. 385 (1896).
109. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1994) (containing the current version of the Indian Reorganization Act).
110. 25 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (containing the current version of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare
Act).
Iil. Id.
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"opt-in/opt-out" provisions did not generally complete the adoption of
Constitutions and Charters until after 1936. For the Indian Tribes in
Oklahoma, whom Congress had initially excluded from the Indian
Reorganization Act, Constitutions and Charters were not widely adopted
until the later part of the decade."l 2 Within five years, the American
participation in the Second World War diverted resources and attention
from the Indian Country, and little progress was made generally in
implementing the promise of those Acts though some Tribes made
major progress due mainly to Tribal assumption of the process of
exploiting Tribal resources such as timber.
By the early 1950's, Congressional policy had again changed.
Beginning as early as 1940, the Indian Reorganization Act had come
under additional Congressional debate. 1l3 Again, the assimilationists in
Congress determined to destroy tribal government and require all
Indians to be "brown white people." Almost without debate, House
Concurrent Resolution 108 was passed on August 1, 1953, which
provided:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible
to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United
States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens
of the United States, and to grant them all the rights and
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship; and
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
Concurring), That it is declared to be the sense of Congress
that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and the
individual members thereof located within the States of
California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all the following
named Indian Tribes and individual members thereof, should
be freed from Federal supervision and control and from all
disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians:
[Flathead, Montana; Klamath, Oregon; Menominee, Wisconsin;
Potowatomie, Kansas & Nebraska; Turtle Mountain Chippewa,
North Dakota] ....
112. Some Tribes did not adopt a Constitution until much later. Examples include the United
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma who adopted their initial Constitution and Charter
in 1951. The Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma and the Kaw Tribe of Oklahoma adopted
their initial Constitutions under these Acts after 1980.
113. Hearings on S. 2103 Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, H.R. 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1940).
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Again, Indian land and Tribal government came under legislative
attack.' 14 In furtherance of this policy, and again expecting Indian
tribes to be relegated to the historical dustbin, Congress passed further
legislation on August 15, 1953, popularly known as Public Law 83-
280.115 In the civil context, this statute extended state civil court
jurisdiction and state civil laws of general application to certain named
Indian Country in five States."l 6 Congress further authorized any other
state to assume civil jurisdiction and extend state law into the Indian
country. This permission allowed the States to act unilaterally until 1968
when the consent of the affected Tribe was required by amendment to
the original act. 117 Termination remained the express policy of
Congress from 1953 through 1973.
President Nixon, in 1970, presented a message to Congress in which
he strongly recommended that Indian tribes be allowed to exercise
control, and at their option to operate federal programs and services
intended for Indian people."l 8 This message ushered in perhaps the
most productive decade of Indian legislation since the creation of the
government. Beginning in 1973 with the passage of the Indian Self-
Determination Act,119 Congress repudiated the assimilationist policy of
termination, and introduced the policy of Self-Determination to Indian
affairs. Most of the Tribes that had been terminated were restored to
federal recognition, the Alaska Native land claims were finally resolved
with the consent of those affected, the Indian Self-Determination Act,120
114. Approximately 109 Tribes were terminated. Termination did not mean so much the
extension of the "rights and privileges" of American citizenship which had been extended to Indians
in 1924. but the abrogation of all federal responsibility to protect Indian resources and Tribal self-
government. It has been estimated that over 1,360,000 acres of Indian land were stripped of federal
protection, a good deal of which was lost to Indian people. The termination policy, as was assimilation
and allotment before it, was designed to destroy the Indian land base and tribal self-government. See
generally Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 Am. IND. L. REV. 139 (1977).
115. 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
116. Id. With certain exceptions thereafter enumerated, the operative language of this section
states:
Each of the States listed in the following table [California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Wisconsin] shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the
name of the State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil
causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to
private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State.
28 U.S.C. §1360 (1994). But see Bryan v. Itasca County. 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) (determining that
state jurisdiction did not extend to the taxing of Indian property within a reservation in a "280" state).
117. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
118. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMrITING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
INDIAN POLICY, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 363,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
119. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994).
120. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1978).
288 [VOL. 72:267
EMPLOYMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,121 and other legislation dealing with
economic and health care issues in the Indian Country was passed. Self-
Determination is the current policy of the Congress, which has expanded
this policy with the next logical step known as "Self-Governance."
These policies are intended to transfer control over federal services,
programs, and functions to Indian tribes, along with the money and
resources necessary to carry them out.
The first "modern" jurisdictional case after the establishment of
the termination policy was Williams v. Lee 122 in which a non-Indian who
operated a general store on the Navajo Reservation brought a state court
action to collect a debt allegedly owed to his store by a member of the
Navajo Tribe.1 23 In rejecting state court jurisdiction in favor of the
Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses, the Court established what was to
become known as the "infringement" test: "Essentially, absent
governing Acts of congress, the question has always been whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them."'124
The Court went on to hold that because state court jurisdiction over
such cases might undermine the authority of the tribal court, the exercise
of state court jurisdiction would infringe on the tribe's right to self-
government and could not be allowed. 125 Perhaps the major problem
with the Court's stated test, other than its possible "negative
implications,"126 was that for preemption purposes, there was a
"governing Act of Congress" at the time the decision was made-Public
Law 83-280.127 The Court in Kennerly v. District Court of Montanal28
recognized the preemptive effect of Public Law 280 when it rejected the
assumption of state court jurisdiction over suits involving tribal members
arising in the Indian Country even where the Tribal Council had
consented to such jurisdiction because the requirements of the Act had
not been satisfied.1 29 Further, as in Williams, the Court mentioned the
failure of the state to comply with the requirements of Public Law 280 as
a reason to reject the extension of state law into the Indian country. 130 It
therefore appeared that Congress, in the exercise of its Constitutional
121. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994).
122. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
123. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217.217-18 (1959).
124. Id. at 220.
125. Id. at 223.
126. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
127. See Pub. L. No. 83-280.
128. 400 U.S.423 (1971).
129. Kennerly v. District Court of Mont., 400 U.S. 423,429 (1971).
130. Id. at 427. In Fisher v. District Court, the Court applied the same preemption/infringement
standard in a case involving only Indians. 424 U.S. 382, 388-89 (1976).
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authority to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, had provided an
exclusive mechanism for the extension of state civil laws of general
application to the Indian country.'31
Three years later, however, the Court decided Bryan v. Itasca
County, 132 in which it ruled that a mobile home owned by an Indian
within Indian country in a Public Law 280 state was not taxable by the
State.' 3 3 In deciding that case, the Court reasoned away the express
language of Public Law 280 that stated: "Those civil laws of such State
that are of general application to private persons or private property shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State,"134 and the express exemption from state
taxation of 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) which states in pertinent part that
"[n]othing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or
taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights,
belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is
held in trust by the United States." 135 Instead, the Court created a
prohibitory-regulatory distinction, again in the face of explicit
congressional language stating the extent to which tribal law would
remain enforceable in the state courts, 136 to find that the statute did not
extend the general laws of the State into the Indian country. 137
The result has been a series of cases which generally reached correct
constitutional results consistent with the Worcester rule,138 but which
created a new balancing test that has ultimately lead the Court into new
and untested ground. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,139
the Court found federal pre-emption of state taxes assessed against a
non-Indian logging company doing business on the White Mountain
131. Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 430. This general authority, obviously, would not have impacted
specific grants of authority to states over certain situations or tribes which were granted by special
statute.
132. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
133. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 375, 391 (1976).
134. Id. at 377-78 (quoting Pub. L. No. 83-280).
135. Id. at 378 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
136. Id. at 386-87 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1360). Section 1360 provides that:
[a]ny tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe,
band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not
inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full force and effect in
the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.
28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (1994).
137. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 389.
138. Until Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), the result in each of
these cases-although not always the reasoning-could be explained through the following rule: In
the absence of an Act of Congress authorizing state action, states have no authority in matters arising
within the Indian Country when Indian property, rights, or persons are involved in the transaction at
issue.
139. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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Apache Reservation on the basis of the extensive federal regulation
governing the harvesting and sale of tribal timber. 140 As in the Williams
case, the Court in Central Machinery v. Arizona Tax Commission'41
found preemption based on the Indian trader statutes and regulations,
although the non-Indian company was not a licensed Indian trader.142
However, the Court in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico 143 found
no preemption although the federal statutes and regulations applicable to
oil and gas mining on Indian land are more extensive and pervasive than
either the Indian trader or Indian timber statutes. 144
Even the original "Indian smokeshop cases" 145 could each be
explained as correct for reason that the taxes being imposed on the
cigarettes at issue were being sold to non-Indians or members of
"foreign" tribes in the sense of Indians from another reservation, 146 and
140. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 149-54 (1980). These regulations
included provisions which restricted clear-cutting, 25 C.F.R. § 141.5; established comprehensive
guidelines for the sale of timber, § 141.7; regulated the advertising of timber sales, §§ 141.8-.9;
specified the manner in which bids may be accepted and rejected, § 141.11; described the
circumstances into which contracts may be entered, §§ 141.12-.13; required approval of all contracts
by the Secretary, § 141.13; called for Secretary approval of timber-cutting permits, § 141.19: specified
fire protective measures, § 141.21; and provided a board of administrative appeals, § 141.23. Tribes
are expressly authorized to .establish commercial enterprises for the harvesting and logging of tribal
timber under § 141.6. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 147.
141. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
142. Central Mach. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n. 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980) (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-
264).
143. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
144. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 179-81 (1989) (citing Act of Feb. 28.
1891, § 3, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1891); Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 244, 25 U.S.C.
§398 (1924); Indian Oil Act of 1927, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1347, 25 U.S.C. § 398a (1927)). The Cotton
Petroleum Court recognized the extensive regulations, noting:
inter alia, that tribal leases may only be offered for sale pursuant to specified standards
governing notice and bidding, 25 CFR § 211.3(a) (1988), that the Secretary reserves "the
right to reject all bids when in his judgment the interests of the Indians will be best served
by so doing," § 211.3(b), that corporate bidders must submit detailed information
concerning their officers, directors, shareholders, and finances, § 211.5, that no single
lease for oil and gas may exceed 2,560 acres, § 211.9, and that a primary lease may not
exceed 10 years, §211.10. The regulations also address the manner of payment and
amount of rents and royalties, §§ 211.12, 211.13(a), and provide for Interior Department
inspection of lessees' premises and records, § 211.18. Other federal regulations address
the spacing, drilling, and plugging of wells and impose reporting requirements
concerning production and environmental protection. See 43 CFR §§ 3160.0-1-3186.4
(1987).
Id. at 186 n.16.
145. See generally California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9
(1985) (finding that the board had a right to require the tribe to collect taxes on cigarette purchases by
non-Indian consumers on behalf of the board); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (finding that the state cigarette and sales tax in on-reservation
purchases by non-members was valid): Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes. 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (finding
that the state requiring the tribal cigarette seller to collect a tax on non-Indian purchasers valid).
146. It should be noted that Congress has rejected the Court's attempt to distinguish between
Indians of the local tribe, and other Indians for jurisdictional purposes. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(recognizing and affirming Tribal criminal jurisdiction over all "Indians"); 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4)
(defining "Indian" as "any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an
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Public Law 280 could be read to extend the state tax laws to persons who
were not members of the Tribe(s) local to the reservation,
notwithstanding Bryan v. Itasca County, which involved a member of the
resident Tribe. Such reasoning would have provided the logical
foundation for the Court's otherwise "bootstrap" statement in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation1 47
that these were "otherwise valid state taxes." 148 The Tenth Circuit,
looking for a critical and logical method of analysis in these cases, held
in Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission,149 that Oklahoma's failure to comply with the requirements
of Public Law 280 was fatal to the extension of state civil authority into
the Indian country in a case in which state taxation of sales by a tribal
smokeship to Indians and non-Indians was at issue.1 50 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed. 151 In doing so, it rejected the notion that
Public Law 280 could be considered a guide to those decisions,1 52 and
continued the line of cases based on Moe and Colville, which in essence
state that if an Indian or Indian tribe import an item of manufactured
goods into the Indian country for resale it will be taxable by the State.153
However, in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians154 the Court
struck down California's attempt to impose taxes on a Tribal gaming
operation because the federal government was encouraging economic
Indian under section 1153 of Title 18 if that person were to commit an offense listed in that section in
Indian country to which that section applies"). These provisions were enacted for the purpose of
reversing the court decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), wherein the Court had
extinguished, by judicial implications, the inherent tribal power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
Indians not of the local tribe. The ruling in Duro is the pentultimate result of the attempt to distinguish
between members of the local tribe and other Indians first announced in Moe and Colville, and the
Congressional rejection of this distinction should also be acknowledged in future civil actions.
147. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
148. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 158
(1980).
149. 888 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1989).
150. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 888 F.2d 1303, 1304
(10th Cir. 1989).
151. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
513 (1991).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 514.
154. 480 U.S. 202 (1986).
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development, including gaming, in the Indian country, and because the
games were "created" by the Tribe.155
To put the problem in a nutshell, it is difficult to ascertain a reliable
rule by which practitioners can adequately advise their clients as to the
ramifications of doing business in the Indian country, or to advise Indian
tribes and Indian people as to the extent of tribal and state authority over
commercial transactions occurring within the Indian country. The net
result is that Indian economic development is being limited to direct
Tribal development without significant active participation by the private
sector. For non-Indians, the question is always what regulations apply to
my business, and what taxes must I pay. The answer is that outside the
Indian country, federal and state laws and taxes apply. Within Indian
country, at least where Indian property or persons are affected, federal
law and tribal law apply, and state law may or may not apply. There is
no way to determine the applicability of state law in a particular case
until a claim by the state is litigated. If the state prevails, then the
business gets to pay three taxes and comply with three sets of regulations
instead of two. Where tribes are located far from centers of economic
activity, and have underdeveloped legal and physical business
infrastructures, the benefits of locating in the Indian Country must be
extensive indeed for a businessperson to volunteer to pay three sets of
taxes and comply with three, perhaps conflicting, regulations instead of
two sets of taxes and regulations. Notwithstanding the Court's regular
protestations to the contrary, only such non-Indian businesses which
exist to exploit a Tribe's natural resources or have no other place in
which to operate, will be willing to locate in the Indian country or
comply with Tribal tax and regulatory laws.
For the individual Indian, the problems are much the same. While
the individual can probably achieve some protections by requiring state
authorities to proceed in tribal court pursuant to Williams and related
cases, most Indian entrepreneurs must maintain bank accounts or other
property outside the Indian country, or rely on suppliers or purchasers
from outside the Indian country to support their business. While the
state may not be able to directly enter the Indian country to enforce their
155. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-22 (1986). It is indeed
difficult to perceive a rationale way to differentiate between cigarettes imported into the Indian
Country and sold to non-Indians and pull tabs, concession items, and other "bingo" paraphernalia
which are imported into the Indian Country and then sold to non-Indians. Likewise, it is difficult to
perceive how the creation of a "gaming business" is conceptually different from the creation of a
"retail business." Perhaps one must conclude that the difference lies simply in the individual
perceptions and prejudices of the Justices as to who Indians are-a conclusion which would be
lamentable. However, there is no way to avoid the conclusion that both circumstances involve
"commerce" in its Constitutional sense between Indians and non-Indians in the Indian Country, and
that Congress has not authorized state taxation or regulation of such activities.
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claims,156 the Court has left the door open for seizure of such off-
reservation property or actions against the wholesalers. As a practical
matter, most small Indian businesses do not have the resources to
withstand such challenges, and if they sell to anyone other than tribal
members, they run the same risks of responding to three levels of
government as do non-Indians.
The Tribes, then, remain as the practical sole source of economic
development in the Indian country.157  Because the Tribe is a
government immune from suit, 158 the state cannot directly sue the Tribe
for taxes claimed to be due. The future of economic development in the
Indian country, then, will remain dependent upon direct federal
assistance, or the physical resources and personnel of the Tribe in its
governmental capacity.159 No other jurisdiction within the United States
suffers such practical judicially made restrictions. If the Tribal
governments continue the success that they have attained to date in their
various economic endeavors, they will constitute the only governmental
entities that operate economically successful businesses in the country
without support from taxes, pure resource exploitation, or a monopoly
on the product or service offered.
The Court will shortly be faced with a further dilemma. With the
arrival of the Self-Governance program,1 60 Tribes are moving toward
administering their own programs, providing their own services, and
exercising the functions formerly the provence of the Secretary of the
156. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505.
512(1991).
157. It is almost unfathomable that the Court would construct a scheme which would impose a
socialistic economy within the Indian Country, yet this is precisely the net effect of its Indian
Commerce Clause rulings.
158. Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. at 514.
159. As late as 1942, Felix Cohen wrote that Indian Country was "the territorial area for tribal
self-government within which federal law applied to the extent intended by Congress, tribal law
applied to all persons and property not inconsistent with specific federal laws and treaties, and state
law did not apply at all unless a specific treaty or act of congress authorized state authority." CoHEN,
supra note 8, at 122. In Colville, the Court stated that "[i]t can no longer be seriously argued that the
Indian Commerce Clause, of its own force, automatically bars all state taxation of matters significantly
touching the political and economic interests of the Tribes." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 (1979) (citing Moe v. Salish & Tootenai Tribes, 425
U.S. 463, 468 n.17 (1976). The Court also stated that the "[c]lause may have a more limited role to
play in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on, Indian commerce." id. Simply stated.
state imposition of taxation and regulatory authority concerning persons, property, or events within the
Indian Country, by definition, burdens Indian commerce, and no amount of legal ledgerdomain will
change the fact that it is cheaper to pay two taxes than two plus one, or to comply with two regulatory
schemes instead of three. Further, the lack of clearly defined rules to determine whether state law
applies in the Indian country has fostered litigation and reduced cooperative tribal and state efforts to
resolve their disputes since each party can reasonably expect to prevail if their advocate can persuade
the Court in a given case that the balance of interests favors their client-a "rule" which is always a
jump ball and encourages litigation.
160. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 458 aa-gg (1994).
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Interior. What becomes of federal preemption, when the federal
administration is no longer in the loop other than as a source of funds
which the Tribes can program to meet their own needs? What will
happen, for instance, when the Tribes contract for the authority to issue
Indian traders' licenses, and then adopt their own internal regulations on
the subject? Without the "negative implications" of the Indian
Commerce clause, it is conceivable that Indian traders licensed by the
Secretary could be tax exempt, while the same trader with another store
in the same state on a reservation licensed by a Tribe in the Self-
Governance program could find that there is no federal preemption
because the Secretary is no longer actively overseeing the activities of the
trader on the Self-Governance reservation. Such a result cannot be the
intent of the Self-Governance statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Why is all this important in the area of labor and employment law?
There are two reasons. First, business needs certainty in order to attract
investment and create jobs at which individuals can find employment.
Just as business needs a physical infrastructure-roads, power, utilities, raw
materials, and a labor force-to survive, it needs a legal infrastructure
providing certainty with respect to taxation, regulation, and enforcement
of business obligations. The Court has done little in the last three
decades to further tribal attempts to provide such legal infrastructure in
tune with Congress' attempts to assist the Tribes to attain economic self-
sufficiency' 6' and tribal values.
Secondly, the inherent authority of the Tribes to control the
employment relationship and conditions of labor within the Indian
Country of the Tribe should be respected and acknowledged if the Tribe
is to be able to provide either the legal infrastructure for business within
161. See Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162,
1170 (9th Cir. 1981). The Alaska court noted:
Congress has clearly expressed its desire to further Indian-owned businesses:
"One of the most serious problems on the Indian reservations is the inadequate
availability of financial resources to permit the Indian people to develop their own
resources and potential. All the traditional indicators of economic levels place Indians
and Indian reservations at the bottom of the scale. On every reservation today, there is
almost a total lack of an economic community. If the long-sought goal of Indian self-
sufficiency is to be reached, such financial assistance must be provided or facilitated.
Income generated through Federal, tribal, or other kinds of activity on the
reservation does not stay on the reservation, pursuant to the classic economic theory of
the "multiplier effect," because of this lack of an economic community. With the
absence of Indian-owned small businesses on the reservation, this income immediately
flows off the reservation enriching the off-reservation, non-Indian communities."
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-907.93d Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2874).
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its Indian Country (which, after all, was reserved to the Tribes for their
homeland and as a place for them to earn a living) or the regulation of
activities within its Indian Country which directly impact on the health,
safety, economic' security, and general welfare of its citizens. 162 In fact,
the few cases which consider tribal ordinances which begin the process
of regulating employment relations within the Indian Country, recognize
that ordinances requiring Indian Country businesses to employ tribal
members and other Indians are legitimate exercises of Tribal
authority.1 63 These cases hold, for instance, that payment of Tribally
required benefits do not necessarily excuse an employers' failure to
abide by contractual requirements to pay benefits for employees, and
that Tribal Employments Rights Ordinances' 64 are applicable to non-
Indian employers doing business on fee lands within a reservation when
the employer had extensive contacts with the Tribe.165
The Tribes, however, should not be limited, or limit themselves, to
employment rights in the sense of requiring employers to employ a
certain percentage of tribal members. As gaming and other economic
opportunities develop within the Indian Country, Tribes will be faced
with development of a legal infrastructure necessary to provide not only
a chance to obtain a job, but greater regulation of the safety and health
aspects of the workplace, the employer-employee relationship, and the
full cornucopia of issues which flow from that relationship.
Circumstances which immediately come to mind include workers'
compensation issues for injuries received during the course of
employment and related occupational health and safety questions, labor
organizations and whether the Tribe's Indian Country will have "right
to work" provisions, requirements for insurance coverage of the
162. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,565-66 (1980).
163. See Cree v. Waterbury, 873 F. Supp. 404, 427-28 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that its tribal
ordinance "is consistent with federal law and has been endorsed by the United States Congress based
on the grounds that it is consistent with the Federal Government's policy of encouraging Indian
employment and with the special legal position of Indians").
The employee must demonstrate a reasonable expectation [of continued employment]
based upon some external source such as state law. In this case, Beebe points to the
provisions of the TERO [Tribal Employment Right Ordinance], which provides him, as
an Indian, with preferential treatment regarding continued employment and promotion.
This Tribal ordinance clearly provides him with the requisite entitlement necessary to
implicate due process [for purposes of a federal claim for denial of civil rights.]
Id. at 430 (citations omitted).
164. These ordinances generally require on reservation employers to employ a certain
percentage of tribal members or other Indians at their businesses or face fines or shutdown of their
businesses. However, there is no reason to believe that Tribes could not use their taxing authority to
accomplish the same purpose by simply levying taxes upon the employer as a percentage of wages,
salaries, or other renumeration paid to non-Indians employed by the employer within the Indian
Country of the Tribe.
165. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1990).
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workplace, tribal chartering and recognition of business organizations
such as corporations, partnerships, and the like, and similar infrastructure
issues. It should be recognized that on occasion the Tribes will chose to
regulate in a manner different from either the state or federal
government, or to not regulate by statute but allow the issues to be
determined within the Tribal Courts. In order for the Tribes to assert
their full rights to self-governance, and in furtherance of the federal
policy aimed at the economic self-sufficiency of the Indian Tribes while
maintaining their Tribe customs, traditions, and values, non-Indian
Courts and the Congress should "tread lightly" in attempting to impose
non-Indian values and requirements within the Indian Country.

